Fairness is an important property of secure electronic commerce.
INTRODUCTION
In practical E-commerce, the participants of a transaction usually do not trust each other. Under this condition, how to protect the merchant and customer's profits is the basis of the secure E-payment. Fair E-payment protocol is the key to solve this problem. That is, we should guarantee both of the two parties' fairness during the transaction.
Fairness is a fundamental problem in exchange protocols [1] . It has a lot of definitions by different researchers. J. Y. Zhou [2] defines that if each participant in a transaction has sufficient evidence to solve the possible dissension, or neither of them predominates during the transaction, the transaction is fair. In Asokan's paper, fairness is defined as each honest participant will not stay in a disadvantage position [3] . In other words a fair exchange protocol ensures that no player can gain an advantage over the other player by misbehaving, misrepresenting or by prematurely aborting the protocol [4] . In summary, fairness means that at the end of exchange, either each party receives the expected item or neither party receives any useful information about the other's item [1] .
The existing E-payment protocols mainly use an on-line or off-line Trusted Third Party (TTP) [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] or semi-trusted third party [12] to assure the fairness of a transaction. But there are many disadvantages: firstly, the third party is apt to become the bottle-neck of a transaction and lead to network congestion; secondly, TTP decreases the protocol's working efficiency and increases the cost of a transaction; last but no least, how to search a third party to serve as the TTP and to make sure that we can find it at anytime is a difficult problem. Now there are mainly two approaches to solve the problem of bottle-neck caused by the third party: the first is to reduce the traffic passing through the third party, the second is to lower the requirements of protocols to the reliability of the third party. But there is rarely a protocol that does not use the third party completely. If we can design a protocol without TTP, all these problems can be solved.
In an electronic commerce transaction, it is essential to guarantee fairness as well as some other characteristics, such as non-repudiation for the actions and security for the exchanged items. In this paper, by using concurrent signatures [13] , we present two protocols. Both of them possess characters of fairness, non-repudiation and security.
Concurrent signature algorithm is first introduced by Chen et al. in 2004 . It exploits the ambiguity property enjoyed by ring signatures [14] and designated verifier signatures [15] . The most prominent characteristic of concurrent signatures is that the two signers create ambiguous signature to exchange first. Only after an extra piece of information is published (that is keystone), both the ambiguous signatures will bind with their true signers and become valid concurrently. That is, before keystone is published, neither of the signers can convince others the validity of the signatures. This algorithm eliminates the need for a third party thoroughly, and satisfies the property that either the two signatures become valid concurrently, or both of them invalid. Therefore, the fairness is achieved. In this paper, we exploit the excellent characteristics of concurrent signatures, and design a new two times concurrent signatures. Based on this, we present our two fair payment protocols for digital products transaction.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We make a basic introduction about concurrent signature first in section 2, then propose two schemes for digital products and analyze their fairness and other characteristics in section 3. Finally, the paper's conclusion and future work is given in section 4. From the introduction above, we can see that signers exchange ambiguous signatures first, and when the keystone is published, the ambiguous signatures come into effect. That is either the two signatures come into effect at the same time, or they are both invalid.
CONCURRENT SIGNATURES

NEW SCHEMES FOR E-COMMERCE TRANSACTION
In this part, we propose two fair E-payment protocols without TTP, the scheme 1 and scheme 2, and make the protocol analysis of both schemes. The two protocols are suitable for digital products transactions in different situation. The transaction flow of scheme 1 is sententious and this scheme can be used in mobile payment. Scheme 2 enhances security of the customers, and it's suitable for the transaction which has higher security requirements by the customers.
Scheme 1
Before the protocol starts, customer Alice opens an electronic check operation by GPRS or other means, and downloads the signature programme to the hand equipment. Then she can choose and buy products anytime. The protocol follows as below: 1. Alice chooses the digital product (such as a piece of digital image) she wants to buy after browses merchant Bob's website by wireless network, and then downloads an order form. After signing the order form with RSA signature, Alice sends it to Bob with an electronic check (e-check) C that is not signed and whose par value is equal to the digital products' price. 2. Bob first validates the identity and e-check's balance information after receiving the order form and check from Alice. If the par value of the check is not enough, the transaction fail and the system will send prompt information to Alice.
After validating Alice's identity, Bob will choose a symmetrical key k (as a secret to hold), and encrypt the digital product with k to get cryptograph M . 
And we must ensure f Hash k , if not, the transaction terminates. If equation 4 is true, the validation is passed. Bob will send key k to Alice and transfer the electronic check to his account by using k in the bank. If equation 4 is false, the validation fails. Bob won't send k to Alice. After receiving k , the bank can verify the validity of e-check C . Only if Bob is a legal accepter of C , the bank will agree the transference.
5. Upon receiving k from Bob, Alice use k to decrypt cryptograph M and get the digital products she wants to buy.
Protocol Analysis of Scheme 1
The analysis of scheme 1 is as below. 1. Fairness: The protocol can guarantee fairness between customer and merchant during transaction.
Alice can decrypt the encrypted product only when Bob publish keystone to take the e-check into effect. Neither of them will suffer from any party's quit from the transaction.
As for Alice, if she dissatisfies with the products' quality or the product is not the same as what the merchant promises, she can charge against Bob with the service guaranty. As the e-check is signed with concurrent signatures, its signer and accepter is one and only, other people can not transfer the check to his or her account without the keystone.
As for Bob, since Alice will send the e-check's information to Bob, it can decrease the vicious purchase situation, in which the par value is not enough for the transaction. And if Bob send the cryptograph M to Alice, but Alice deny that she does not receive it, or because of the network Alice does not receive it, Bob will also not suffer from it. Because only after keystone is published can Alice decrypt M to get the right digital products. 2. Non-repudiation: Alice can't deny she signed the check with k , as the concurrent signature's signer is one and only. After the transaction Alice can not deny she get the right digital products, because cryptograph M is signed by Bob, it can only be decrypted by the right keystone. Bob can't deny he take the check, as only when somebody offers the right key can he transfer the check to his account, and he is the only receiver of the e-check. 3. Security: If an attacker intercepts Alice's e-check at step 1, as the check is not signed, the attacker can not transfer the check. At other step, if the signed check is intercepted, as the keystone is not published to others except Alice, nobody can transfer it to his or her account without keystone. Since the digital envelope can be decrypted only by Alice, nobody else can imitate Alice to sign the check by f . Last but not least, there are just Alice and Bob taking part in the transaction, so the conspiracy problem can be avoided. 4. The transaction flow of this scheme is sententious. During the transaction, there just two participants taking part in it. This scheme can be used in mobile payment.
Scheme 2
This scheme uses a new two times concurrent signatures, and the signature's detailed algorithm is included in the following protocol. Before the transaction, Alice should open an electronic check operation. The protocol follows as below: 1. This step is nearly the same as scheme 1. Alice chooses the product she wants to buy after browses merchant Bob's website, and then downloads an order form. After signing the order form with RSA signature, Alice sends it to Bob with an echeck C that is not signed and whose par value is equal to the digital products' price. 2. Upon receiving the signed order and electronic check from Alice, Bob validates the identity and e-check's balance information. If the par value of the check is not enough, the transaction fail and the system will send prompt information to Alice. After validating Alice's identity, Bob will choose a symmetrical key 1 k (as a secret to hold), and encrypt the digital products with k to get cryptograph M . In the equations above, Bob is a legal accepter of C , the bank will agree the transference.
Protocol Analysis of Scheme 2
The analysis of scheme 2 is similar with scheme 1, and it is as below. Also Bob can't deny he has taken the check, as only when somebody offers the right key can he transfer the check to his account, and Bob is the only accepter of the check. If the check has been transferred, it must be done by Bob.
3. Security: If an attacker intercepts the signed check or cryptograph M during the transaction, there will be no loss for Alice and Bob. As the two keystones are not published to others and the check's accepter is one and only, nobody can transfer it to one's account or decrypt M without keystones. Since the digital envelope can be decrypted only by Alice, nobody else can imitate Alice to sign the check by 1 f , that is the check's signature is one and only. There are just two parties in the transaction, so the conspiracy problem can be avoided. In conclusion, the scheme can guarantee transaction's security. 4. As before Alice publishes 2 k , she can get the product first and check its quality.
So this scheme increases requirements for merchants' credit and the quality of products, and it can protect customers' benefit well. Generally speaking, compared with merchants, customers are vulnerable groups in e-commerce. It is better to solve the probable problems before transferring check than to solve them after the transaction has ended. In conclusion, this scheme enhances security of the customers, and it's suitable for the transaction which has higher security requirements by the customers.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed two protocols based on concurrent signatures. Scheme 1 guarantees that the two parties get the expected item they want to exchange concurrently. Scheme 2 protects customers' benefit well and enhances their security by using a new two times concurrent signatures. The most prominent characteristic of our protocols is that we get rid of the traditional TTP, and the protocols satisfy fairness and some other characteristics by using concurrent signature scheme. Both the benefits of customers and merchants can be protected, and the network congestion brought by a traditional TTP can also be avoided.
In our protocols, whether the keystone is published determines whether electronic checks become valid or electronic products are decrypted. Thus the party who holds keystone has the initiative in the transaction. The future work includes how to obtain absolute fairness as well as efficiency in order to apply it in a more resource-limited environment such as mobile communication.
